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Security in quantum cryptography [1, 2] is continuously challenged by inventive attacks [3–7]
targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new counter-
measures [8–10] to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are
the most frequently attacked components. Recently it was shown that two-photon interfer-
ence [11] from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the
two ends of the communication channel [12, 13]. This new form of detection-safe quantum
cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-
QKD), has been experimentally demonstrated [13–18], but with modest delivered key rates.
Here we introduce a novel pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference
from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform quantum cryptography without detector vul-
nerabilities with unprecedented bit rates, in excess of 1 Mb/s. This represents a 2 to 6 orders
of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and for the first time promotes the
new scheme as a practical resource for quantum secure communications.
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2In Quantum Cryptography, a sender Alice transmits encoded quantum signals to a receiver Bob,
who measures them and distils a secret string of bits with the sender via public discussion [1].
Ideally, the use of quantum signals guarantees the information-theoretical security of the commu-
nication [2]. In practice, however, Quantum Cryptography is implemented with real components,
which can deviate from the ideal description. This can be exploited to circumvent the quantum
protection if the users are unaware of the problem [19].
Usually the most complex components are also the most vulnerable. Therefore the vast majority
of the attacks performed so far have targeted Bob’s single photon detectors [3–7]. MDI-QKD [12, 13]
is a recent form of Quantum Cryptography conceived to remove the problem of detector vulnera-
bility. As depicted in Fig. 1(a), two light pulses are independently encoded and sent by Alice and
Bob to a central node, Charlie. This is similar to a quantum access network configuration [20],
but in MDI-QKD the central node does not need to be trusted and could even attempt to steal
information from Alice and Bob. To follow the MDI-QKD protocol, Charlie must let the two light
pulses interfere at the beam splitter inside his station and then measure them. The result can
disclose the correlation between the bits encoded by the users, but not their actual values, which
therefore remain secret. If Charlie violates the protocol and measures the pulses separately, he
can learn the absolute values of the bits, but not their correlation. Therefore he cannot announce
the correct correlation to the users, who will then unveil his attempt through public discussion.
Irrespective of Charlie’s choice, the users’ apparatuses no longer need a detector and the detection
vulnerability of Quantum Cryptography is removed.
This striking feature of MDI-QKD has fostered intense experimental work and various demon-
strations have been provided so far [13–18]. However, to achieve high-visibility interference at
Charlie’s beam splitter, the light source in previous experiments was set to emit long pulses at
modest clock rates, thus restricting the key rate to less than a hundred bit/s (see Table I).
Here we demonstrate a novel high-rate source of indistinguishable pulses from gain-switched
laser diodes, ideally suited to MDI-QKD. We use a pair of these sources each generating 109
pulses per second, thereby achieving Quantum Cryptography immune to detector attacks at key
rates exceeding 1 Mbps for the first time. This is orders of magnitude higher than in previ-
ous demonstrations and is comparable to the highest values achieved for conventional Quantum
Cryptography [21]. Furthermore we demonstrate operation for channel loss greater than 20 dB,
corresponding to over 100 km of standard fibre. Implementation with real fibre and the effect of a
finite sample have also been considered in the experiment.
To suit MDI-QKD, the light sources in Alice and Bob have to match stringent criteria. They
3FIG. 1. (a) MDI-QKD scheme. Phase-randomised optical pulses are produced by Alice and Bob, set to
the desired polarization and intensity, and sent to Charlie. There, they interfere at the beam splitter (BS),
pass through the polarizing BS’s (PBS’s) and reach the four detectors. Coincidence counts from cH/dV or
dH/cV (cH/cV or dH/dV) are grouped under the label |Ψ−〉 (|Ψ+〉), called ‘singlet’ (‘triplet’) [13]. The
measurement outcomes are publicly announced by Charlie. (b) Experimental MDI-QKD setup. The light
sources, which are essential to the results in this work, are enclosed by the dashed lines in Alice’s and Bob’s
setup. C: circulator; FBG: fibre Bragg grating; POL (INT): polarization (intensity) module.
should emit indistinguishable pulses, to enable high-visibility two-photon interference [11], and at
the same time each pulse should display a random optical phase, to meet a fundamental security
condition [22]. In most demonstrations so far [13, 15–17], light pulses have been carved from a
continuous-wave laser. However, the pulses generated this way have a constant or slowly varying
optical phase thus violating the random phase condition. An external phase modulator can obviate
this problem [15], but at the expense of increasing cost and complexity of the setup. Semiconduc-
tor gain-switched laser diodes can naturally generate short optical pulses (<50 ps) with random
phases [23]. However, the emitted light pulses display a substantial time jitter due to the ran-
dom nature of the spontaneous emission starting the lasing action. Furthermore they have also a
significant spectral width, far exceeding the time-bandwidth limit, due to the frequency chirping
arising from transient variation of carrier density in the active medium. These effects combine
dramatically to reduce the visibility of the interference. As theoretically depicted in Fig. 2(a),
temporal jitter and chirp lead to a poor visibility (upper-right corner of the figure). This has so
far prevented the use of gain-switched laser diodes to achieve high-speed MDI-QKD.
Here we propose a novel technique based on pulsed laser seeding to produce low-jitter close-to-
transform-limited phase-randomized light pulses from gain-switched lasers. A master laser injects
photons into the cavity of a second slave laser through an optical circulator, see Fig. 1(b). The
lasing action of the slave laser is then initiated by stimulated emission from the light of the master
laser rather than by its own spontaneous emission, thus reducing the uncertainty in its emission
4TABLE I. Key rates in existing MDI-QKD experiments and comparison with this work. Letters A-D
correspond to Refs. [14–17], respectively. Low source clock rate (2nd column) and large pulse width (3rd
column) have been used in previous experiments to achieve high-visibility two-photon interference. In
one case (B, lower line) a single laser has been employed for both users. Obtaining high visibility from
two independent light sources at 1 GHz clock rate and 35 ps pulse width is a major challenge, solved in
this work, and can dramatically increase the key rate of MDI-QKD. SSPD: superconducting single photon
detector; SD: self-differencing; APD: avalanche photo diode.
time. Furthermore, the competition between the cavity modes of the slave laser is immediately
resolved by the presence of the master laser’s light, thus narrowing the bandwidth of the emitted
pulses. The combined effect increases the visibility of the interference between the two narrow
pulses emitted by the users’ slave lasers. Moreover, the pulsed laser seeding guarantees that the
phase of each slave laser is inherited from its own master laser. Due to the fact that the master
laser is gain-switched, the master pulse, and hence the slave pulse, has a random optical phase [23].
The improvement in the interference visibility achieved via the pulsed seeding technique is visible
from Fig. 2(a), where time jitter, bandwidth and visibility of the light sources are experimentally
measured and compared against the theoretical prediction. Without pulsed seeding, time jitter and
bandwidth of the source amount to 12.3 ps and 63 GHz, respectively, leading to a poor visibility
of 25% and therefore to low key rates. With pulsed laser seeding, on the contrary, they become
as small as 4.4 ps and 15 GHz, respectively. For these values we expect an interference visibility
5FIG. 2. (a) Theoretical contour plot of the two-photon interference visibility versus emission time jitter
(horizontal axis) and bandwidth (vertical axis) of the pulses. The arrow shows how pulsed laser seeding
improves the measured time jitter and bandwidth (empty circles), thus enhancing the interference visibility.
The dashed black line depicts the maximum measured visibility. (b) Intensity data points and corresponding
probability distribution from first-order interference between two consecutive pulses emitted by a seeded
laser. The profile of the distribution suggests that the pulses have a random phase [23].
of 48.5%, in good agreement with the experimentally measured value of 48.2% and close to the
theoretical maximum of 50% [24]. The phase randomisation of the pulses emitted by the seeded
slave laser is confirmed in Fig. 2(b), where the intensity probability distribution has the typical
profile expected from the interference of two pulses with random relative phase [23].
We performed a series of MDI-QKD experiments using the setup in Fig. 1(b). The results are
summarized in Fig. 3 and detailed in [25] (see also Table I). The data points represented by the
solid squares are obtained by using variable attenuators to reproduce the attenuation of standard
single mode fibres (0.2 dB/km). The leftmost point corresponds to a rate of 1.257 Mbit/s, a record
in terms of key rate mediated by two-photon interference. The rightmost point corresponds to
about 4 kbit/s over 21 dB attenuation, which is still sufficient to generate a 256-AES key more
frequently than every 100 ms [26].
Following the analysis in Ref. [27], we consider how the statistical fluctuations of a finite data
sample can affect the secure key rate. With the empty square point in Fig. 3, we report the finite-
size key rate of the system for a 2.33 dB attenuation channel. It amounts to 366 kbit/s and is
obtained by gathering the counts from the triplet and singlet states. The finite-size dependence on
6FIG. 3. MDI-QKD key rates versus total attenuation (lower axis) and equivalent fibre distance (upper axis)
of the quantum channel. Solid squares refer to the key rates obtained by varying the channel attenuation
in the setup. The empty star is for the rate obtained using two 25-km reels of single mode fibre. The
empty square represents the rate after the finite size of the data sample is taken into account. In this case,
the total sample size is ∼ 2.4 × 107, acquired in 12,000 seconds. For comparison, we also add the highest
observed finite-size key rate to date for conventional QKD (empty triangle) [21]. The pie-chart contains
the distribution of coincidence counts among the four possible outcomes of Charlie’s measurement, for the
2.33 dB loss case. With reference to Fig. 1(a), S1, S2, T1 and T2 indicate the coincidence counts of detectors
cH/dV, dH/cV, cH/cV and dH/dV, respectively.
the channel attenuation is observed to have a similar slope as that in the asymptotic regime.
To replicate a real deployment scenario, we replace the channel attenuation with two single
mode fibre spools of 25 km each. We employ two dispersion compensation modules designed for
20 km to cancel the broadening of the pulses due to the chromatic dispersion in the fibre. We
also compensate the temporal drift of the arrival time of the pulses at Charlie’s beam splitter due
to temperature variations. We find that the distilled key rate (empty star in Fig. 3) is almost
identical to the one obtained from the channel attenuation, proving that fibre-induced effects can
7be effectively mitigated. All the points in Fig. 3 have been numerically simulated along the lines
of Refs. [28, 29] to confirm the results and optimize the system.
To illustrate the progress entailed by these results, we report in Fig. 3 with an empty triangle
the state-of-the-art point [21] of finite-size decoy-state QKD, for a distance of 50 km under similar
detection conditions as in the present experiment. Quite impressively, the QKD key rate is only
one order of magnitude higher than the corresponding MDI-QKD asymptotic rate, the difference
being largely accountable to the non-unitary efficiency of the single photon detectors.
These results prove that MDI-QKD can distribute keys at rates similar to conventional Quantum
Cryptography and promote it as a practical solution to serve real-world secure communications.
METHODS
Experimental setup
Alice and Bob consist of two independent pulsed laser seeding-enabled light sources producing
phase-randomised 35 ps-long laser pulses at 1550 nm at the repetition rate of 1 GHz. Variable
optical band pass filters with 20 GHz bandwidth are aligned to remove any spurious emission.
Fibre Bragg gratings are added to pre-compensate for the pulse broadening in the fibre experiment.
Polarization and intensity of the pulses are set as required in the protocol and power meters are
used to monitor the average photon fluxes. This lets each user prepare weak coherent states in
one of four polarization states: H, V (rectilinear basis, or Z) or D, A (diagonal basis, or X). The
Z basis is used to distil the key bits, while the X basis is used to test the noise on the quantum
channel. Alice and Bob select the intensity of the states among four possible values, or “classes”:
s (signal), u (decoy 1), v (decoy 2), w (vacuum). This is different from previous protocols [13],
where three intensity settings rather than four were used, and allows for higher key rates [30].
For the class s, they assign a polarization state from the Z basis, either H or V . For the other
classes, they assign a polarization state from the X basis, either D or A. The intensity is in the
range of 0.7 photons/pulse for the Z basis and between 0 and 0.08 photons/pulse for the X basis.
The users send the resulting states to Charlie, with probabilities ps = pZ = 1 − pX = 45/48 and
pu = pv = pw = pX/3. In Charlie, the beam splitter output ports are spliced to the polarizing
beam splitter input ports to ensure polarization alignment to the rectilinear basis and reduce losses.
Four InGaAs self-differencing avalanche photodiodes are gated at 1 GHz and synchronised to the
arrival time of the photons with 1 ns intrinsic deadtime. Under these conditions the detectors have
8an effective active window of around 100 ps and are able to measure up to 500 Mcps [31]. Their
efficiency is kept close to 30% for the whole duration of the experiment. For attenuation levels
up to 16 dB it is advantageous to operate detectors at room temperature (20 ◦C), to reduce the
afterpulse probability, while for larger attenuation values it is beneficial to operate them at 0 ◦C,
to produce a smaller dark count rate. At 20 ◦C and 0 ◦C, the afterpulse probability amounts to
6.5% and 8.6%, respectively, and the dark count probability per gate is 6.50×10−5 and 2.64×10−5,
respectively. Temporal overlap between the pulses is initially achieved by maximizing the single
counts within the detection window of the gated detector. This is then fine-tuned by directly
measuring the interference visibility in the matched Z basis.
Pulsed laser seeding
Each user is endowed with two gain-switched lasers, one of which acts as the master and the other as
the slave. The two lasers are driven by square waves at 1 GHz through their AC port. An electrical
delay allows to vary the timing between the two driving signals. The DC level of the master laser
is set below the threshold ensuring a random phase, but is sufficiently high to have little turn-on
delay and produce ∼250 ps pulses. That of the slave is set low enough to assure that no lasing
is possible in the absence of the master laser photons. With seeding photons from the master
laser, the slave laser produces pulses around 35 ps wide and close to the time-bandwidth product
limit. In Fig. 2(a), the time jitter and frequency bandwidth of the pulses are measured using a
fast sampling oscilloscope and an optical spectrum analyser. To test the visibility of the setup we
perform a two-photon interference experiment using superconducting single photon detectors. The
photon count rate was tuned to give ∼ 106 counts/s per detector. Data was acquired for 50 seconds
using a time window of 350 ps around the central peak resulting in a visibility value of 0.482. For
the data presented in Fig. 2(b), we use an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer with an added
delay of 1 ns in one arm connected to the output of a seeded slave laser. The interference intensity
between subsequent pulses is measured using a PIN photodiode and an oscilloscope. The histogram
presented is the result of an acquisition of 105 points.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A. Protocol
To increase the final key rate, we adopt an optimised protocol, similar to the one described in [1].
It makes use of four intensity settings rather than three to decouple the data basis Z from the
test basis X. This allows a large photon flux in the Z basis, in the range of 0.7 photons/pulse,
thus resulting in a high count rate, in the order of tens of millions counts per second for short
distances. It also allows a small photon flux in the X basis, which is optimal for the parameter
estimation based on decoy states [2, 3]. Moreover, we perform decoy state estimation through a
numerical routine based on linear programming, detailed below. This increases size and stability of
the resulting key rate. All the relevant experimental settings and rates for this protocol are given
below in Tables II, III, IV, V.
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
Preparation: Alice and Bob prepare phase-randomised weak coherent states with mean photon
number µi (Alice) and µj (Bob). The mean photon number µl, l = {i, j}, is randomly chosen
among four possible values [1]: s (signal), u (decoy 1), v (decoy 2), w (vacuum). When µl = s, the
users randomly assign a polarization state from the Z basis, either H or V . When µl 6= s, they
randomly assign a polarization state from the X basis, either D or A. They send the resulting
state to Charlie with probabilities ps = pZ = 1− pX = 45/48 and pu = pv = pw = pX/3.
Detection and announcement: Charlie performs a Bell measurement on the incoming states. In
every run, if at least two detectors click, Charlie publicly announces which detectors clicked. From
the announcement, the users draw the successful events, defined as the coincidence counts from
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two detectors associated to orthogonal (H/V ) polarizations. When more than two detectors are
announced, the users draw all pairwise detector events compatible with the announcement. With
reference to Fig. 1, a coincidence count from detectors cH/dV or cV/dH (cH/cV or dH/dV) is
assigned to the singlet state |ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉) (triplet state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|HV 〉 +
|V H〉)) [4].
Sifting: Alice and Bob announce the bases (Z or X) for all the successful events. They perform
sifting by keeping the results whenever they have used identical bases and discard the others. Bob
performs a bit flip of all his measured bits, except when the matching basis is X and the successful
event is a triplet [4].
Key distillation: From the sifted bits, Alice and Bob quantify the gains Q
(k)
ZZ , Q
(k)
XX and the error
rates E
(k)
ZZ , E
(k)
XX separately for each basis and for the triplet (k = T ) and singlet (k = S) states.
From the X-basis quantities the users estimate the single photon gain q
(k)
X and the error rate e
(k)
X
using the decoy state technique. They then use q
(k)
X to infer a lower bound on q
(k)
Z . The final
key rate R of the system is determined by the rate equations: R = R(T ) + R(S); R(k) = q
(k)
Z [1 −
h(e
(k)
X )] − fECQ(k)ZZh(EkZZ), where k = {T, S}, h is the binary entropy function and fEC = 1.16
quantifies how close to the Shannon limit the error correction (EC) performs.
Post-processing: The users run error correction, privacy amplification and all the due post-
processing to obtain the final key and secure the overall communication. In this protocol, only
results from the rectilinear basis are error-corrected and privacy-amplified. Diagonal basis results
are used only for the estimation of the single photon quantities and do not contribute to the raw
keys.
B. Distillation procedure
In the described protocol, the users distill two separate key rates, one for the singlet (|Ψ−〉) and
one for the triplet (|Ψ+〉) state. The final key rate is given by the sum of the two contributions.
Here, we aim to explain the distillation procedure that links the raw count rates to the final key
bits. It can be applied to the singlet and triplet data sets separately or to the data set obtained by
gathering the data from the two states in a single group. This makes the index k redundant and
we drop it from the following discussion. We can then rewrite the key rate equation given above
in a more explicit way:
R = p2Z
(
sie
−si) (sje−sj) y1,1Z [1− h(e1,1X )]− fECQsi,sjZZ h (Esi,sjZZ ) . (1)
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In Eq. (1), Q
si,sj
ZZ and E
si,sj
ZZ are the gain and the error rate, respectively, measured in the rectilinear
basis (see Table III) when Alice (index ‘i’) and Bob (index ‘j’) send weak coherent states with mean
photon numbers (or “classes”) si and sj , respectively. We note that according to our protocol, the
‘s’ class is selected whenever the basis Z is chosen, so the probability ps to prepare s coincides
with pZ . The key bits are extracted from the s class only, whereas the classes u, v and w are used
to perform the decoy state estimation [2, 3]. Because independent weak coherent states are used,
the probability that the users simultaneously emit a single photon is the product of two Poisson
distributions, which appears in the first pair of brackets in Eq. (1). The quantity y1,1Z is the single
photon yield in the Z basis, i.e., the probability that Charlie declares a detection given that Alice
and Bob sent out single photon signals. This quantity is not measurable without true single photon
sources and has to be estimated using the decoy state technique. Similarly, the quantity e1,1X is the
single photon error rate, i.e., the probability that the users detect an error from Charlie’s declared
data given that they sent out single photon signals, and has to be estimated using the decoy state
technique.
Decoy state estimation
We perform the decoy state estimation using a constrained optimization numerical routine similar
to Ref. [5]. The first step is to estimate a lower bound for the quantity y1,1Z in Eq. (1), to lower bound
the key rate R. This is a typical constrained minimization problem, where y1,1Z is the objective
function and the constraints are given by the counts acquired in the experiment. However, instead
of minimizing y1,1Z , we minimize y
1,1
X , i.e. the single photon yield in the X basis. In the asymptotic
limit, this is justified by the equality y1,1Z = y
1,1
X . In the finite-size case, we can use the fact that,
provided that the sample in the X basis is smaller than the one in the Z basis, the lower bound
to y1,1X also represents a lower bound to y
1,1
Z [6]. The condition about the sizes of the two samples
in the bases Z and X is fulfilled in our experiment, due to the higher photon flux used in the Z
basis.
For the objective function y1,1X , the constraints are given by the coincidence counts in the X
basis. By dividing the coincidence counts in the X basis (see Table IV below) by the number of
pulses sent by the users in the X basis (see following section), we can obtain the quantities Q
µi,µj
XX ,
which can be plugged in the following equation [4]:
Q
µi,µj
XX =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
(
µmi
m!
e−µi
)(
µnj
n!
e−µj
)
ym,nX .
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Here, m and n indicate the number of photons emitted by Alice and Bob, respectively. When µi
and µj run over u, v and w, we obtain 9 independent equations, representing the constraints of the
problem. We can rewrite the constraints as:
Q
µi,µj
XX e
µieµj =
∞∑
m,n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX
=
K∑
m,n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX +
K∑
m=0
∞∑
n=K+1
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX +
+
∞∑
m=K+1
K∑
n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX +
∞∑
m,n=K+1
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX
From the above equation, the following bounds can be obtained:
K∑
m,n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX ≤ eµieµjQ
µi,µj
XX , (2)
K∑
m,n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX ≥ eµieµj
[
Q
µi,µj
XX −
(
1− Γ (1 +K,µi)
K!
Γ (1 +K,µj)
K!
)]
, (3)
where Γ (a, b) =
∫∞
b t
a−1e−tdt is the incomplete gamma function. Eqs. (2), (3) represent a total
of 9 + 9 = 18 constraints. However, as it can be seen from Table IV, the counts obtained from
the classes vw, wv and ww are much fewer than those from the other classes, leading to larger
statistical fluctuations. In this case, we found it advantageous to combine the counts from these
classes and rewrite the associated constraints in a single cumulative constraint (see also [7]). This
reduces the total number of constraints for the above-described problem to 7 + 7 = 14. Finally, in
addition to Eqs. (2), (3), we also set the condition that the yields are probabilities, i.e., ym,nX ∈ [0, 1]
for every m,n.
For the single photon error rate we adopt a procedure similar to the one just described. This
time, we need to maximize the quantity e1,1X . The constraints are given by the following equa-
tions [4]:
Q
µi,µj
XX E
µi,µj
XX = e
−µie−µj
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX e
m,n
X ,
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which leads to the following bound:
Q
µi,µj
XX E
µi,µj
XX e
µieµj =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX e
m,n
X
= y0,0X e
0,0
X +
∞∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX e
0,n
X +
∞∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X e
m,0
X +
∞∑
m=1
∞∑
n=1
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX e
m,n
X
=
1
2
y0,0X +
1
2
∞∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX +
1
2
∞∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X +
∞∑
m=1
∞∑
n=1
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX e
m,n
X
≥ 1
2
y0,0X +
1
2
K∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX +
1
2
K∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X +
J∑
m=1
J∑
n=1
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX e
m,n
X . (4)
In the third line we set e0,0X = e
0,n
X = e
m,0
X =
1
2 and in the last line we have dropped some non-
negative terms from the sum. From the last line of Eq. (4), we carry on only the terms corresponding
to J = 1 and drop all the remaining ones. Because the dropped terms are non-negative, we can
write:
Q
µi,µj
XX E
µi,µj
XX e
µieµj ≥ 1
2
y0,0X +
1
2
K∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX +
1
2
K∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X + µiµjy
1,1
X e
1,1
X . (5)
This can be rewritten as:
e1,1X ≤
1
µiµjy
1,1
X
(
Q
µi,µj
XX E
µi,µj
XX e
µieµj − 1
2
y0,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX −
1
2
K∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X
)
≤ 1
µiµjy
1,1
X
(
Q
µi,µj
XX E
µi,µj
XX e
µieµj − 1
2
y0,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
µnj
n!
y0,nX −
1
2
K∑
m=1
µmi
m!
ym,0X
)
, (6)
where in the last line we have indicated with y1,1X the lower bound to y
1,1
X obtained in the previous
yield minimization problem. Eq. (6) represents a set of 9 constraints. As mentioned for the single
photon yield optimization problem, the data sets obtained from the classes vw, wv and ww are
much smaller than the others, so it is beneficial to gather them. We write explicitly the constraints
for the least significant classes:
e1,1X ≤
1
y1,1X
× 1
vw
(
QvwXXE
vw
XXe
vew − 1
2
y0,0X −
1
2
K∑
m=1
vm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
wn
n!
y0,nX
)
e1,1X ≤
1
y1,1X
× 1
wv
(
QwvXXE
wv
XXe
wev − 1
2
y0,0X −
1
2
K∑
m=1
wm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
vn
n!
y0,nX
)
e1,1X ≤
1
y1,1X
× 1
w2
(
QwwXXE
ww
XXe
2w − 1
2
y0,0X −
1
2
K∑
m=1
wm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
wn
n!
y0,nX
)
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By adding the three inequalities above we obtain the following cumulative constraint:
e1,1X ≤
1
3y1,1X
[
1
vw
(
QvwXXE
vw
XXe
vew − 1
2
K∑
m=0
vm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
wn
n!
y0,nX
)
+
+
1
wv
(
QwvXXE
wv
XXe
wev − 1
2
K∑
m=0
wm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
vn
n!
y0,nX
)
+
+
1
w2
(
QwwXXE
ww
XXe
2w − 1
2
K∑
m=0
wm
m!
ym,0X −
1
2
K∑
n=1
wn
n!
y0,nX
)]
. (7)
The 7 constraints given in Eqs. (6) and (7) have to be added to the 14 specified for the yields
in Eqs. (2) and (3) (including the mentioned cumulative constraint), thus providing a total of 21
constraints for the maximization of e1,1X . In addition to these constraints, we also specify in the
problem the range of the quantities ym,nX , which is the closed interval [0, 1].
Finite size key rate
To derive the secure key rate in the presence of the statistical fluctuations of the finite sample, we
follow the approach in Ref. [8] (see also [9] for a detailed analysis of this subject). We assume that
the statistical fluctuations obey a Gaussian distribution [10]. Therefore it is possible to set the
desired failure probability ε of the estimation procedure by solving the equation 1−erf (n/√2) = ε,
where n is the (not necessarily integer) number of standard deviations adding up to form the
statistical error of the measured value. We find it convenient to set n = 7 and obtain ε =
2.56× 10−12. Because in our decoy state estimation we use 21 constraints, this choice assures that
the overall failure probability of the estimation of the parameters is less than 5.4× 10−11.
We then consider the fluctuation function:
F (x, n) =
n√
x
, (8)
where x represents the size of the considered data sample. This function is used to make the
constraints in the optimization problems for y1,1X and e
1,1
X looser. For example, the inequality in
Eq. (2)
K∑
m,n=0
µmi
m!
µnj
n!
ym,nX ≤ eµieµjQ
µi,µj
XX
in the finite-size scenario becomes:
K∑
m,n=0
um
m!
vn
n!
ym,nX ≤ euevQu,vXX
[
1 + F
(
Nu,vXXQ
u,v
XX , 7
)]
,
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where Nu,vXX is the total number of runs where Alice and Bob emitted pulses in the class u and v,
respectively. Because the resulting constraint is looser, the finite-size solution is always worse than
the one in the asymptotic scenario, and the key rate is reduced. This explains why the finite-size
key rate for a channel attenuation of 2.33 dB is about 30% of the asymptotic key rate when the
total size of the sample is ∼ 2.4×107 (see Table IV). The presence of a factor √x in the fluctuation
function F , Eq. (8), explicitly shows that it is always best to gather the counts from the singlet
and triplet data sets in a single group to maximize the finite-size key rate. Because the sizes of the
separate triplet and singlet data sets are approximately equal, the size of the total sample is about
twice as large as the separate samples. This, according to Eq. (8), entails a factor
√
2 advantage
in the key rate if the total sample is used.
The key rate obtained by joining the data sets from the singlet and the triplet states amounts
to 366 kbit/s. The number of prepared pulses are Nu,uXX = N
u,v
XX = N
u,w
XX = N
v,u
XX = N
w,u
XX =
(5× 102)× (4× 109), acquired in 500 seconds, and Nv,vXX = Nv,wXX = Nw,vXX = Nw,wXX = (1.25× 102)×
(4× 109), acquired in 125 seconds, where Nµi,µjXX is the total number of runs where Alice and Bob
simultaneously emitted pulses in the class µi and µj , respectively.
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C. Key rates
Channel attenuation/distance
Key rate
[kbit/s]
2.33 dB (11.65 km) 1256.5
2.33 dB (11.65 km) | Finite size 366.3
6.15 dB (30.75 km) 325.8
9.82 dB (49.10 km) 98.2
50 km (9.65 dB) | Real fibre 98.4
15.97 dB (79.85 km) 15.9
20.98 dB (104.9 km) 4.2
TABLE II. Key rate R versus channel attenuation (dB) or equivalent distance (km) in a single mode optical
fibre featuring 0.2 dB/km attenuation.
D. Count and error rates in the rectilinear basis
Channel attenuation/distance
Singlet
|Ψ−〉
Triplet
|Ψ+〉
sA = sB
C
(S)
ZZ E
(S)
ZZ C
(T )
ZZ E
(T )
ZZ ph/pulse
2.33 dB (11.65 km) 288399 0.33% 287902 0.35% 0.7
2.33 dB (11.65 km) — Finite size 307574 0.29% 308259 0.25% 0.7
6.15 dB (30.75 km) 139817 0.47% 139345 0.52% 0.7
9.82 dB (49.10 km) 39881 0.61% 39993 0.63% 0.7
50 km (9.65 dB) — Real fibre 53411 0.81% 54058 0.86% 0.7
15.97 dB (79.85 km) 14704 0.95% 14657 1.14% 0.6
20.98 dB (104.9 km) 3238 1.20% 3211 0.97% 0.55
TABLE III. Measured coincidence counts (CZZ) and error rates (EZZ) in the rectilinear basis, separately
for the singlet and the triplet states. Acquisition time is 80 ms for each attenuation/distance value.
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E. Count rates in the diagonal basis
Channel attenuation/distance
Singlet
|Ψ−〉
Triplet
|Ψ+〉
µi = µj
Class u v w u v w ph/pulse
2.33 dB (11.65 km)
u
v
w
223041
84703
71263
92393
14119
9218
80410
9514
5516
225777
85996
72727
93290
14362
9353
80759
9780
5778
0.01
0.002
0.001
2.33 dB (11.65 km) — Finite size
u
v
w
4771407
1774040
1506023
1967827
73783
46317
1693057
47749
27113
4853012
1773149
1510257
1969107
73789
46591
1690185
48136
27348
0.01
0.002
0.001
6.15 dB (30.75 km)
u
v
w
218848
93154
80250
79813
13655
9458
67269
8681
5276
222021
93588
81479
80688
13955
9410
67866
8710
5377
0.016
0.0032
0.0016
9.82 dB (49.10 km)
u
v
w
170331
67118
57570
69123
11298
7397
59436
7674
4694
174234
68020
57787
70675
11749
7526
60709
7831
4759
0.025
0.005
0.0025
50 km (9.65 dB) — Real fibre
u
v
w
239876
88586
74187
98512
14526
9310
85722
9854
5604
244648
89817
74644
98477
14946
9275
85958
9721
5745
0.025
0.005
0.0025
15.97 dB (79.85 km)
u
v
w
226108
88114
74616
82071
11477
7051
69065
6971
3401
225133
87615
75312
83685
11730
7078
70665
7033
3461
0.05
0.01
0.005
20.98 dB (104.9 km)
u
v
w
142656
56455
48101
50799
7057
4391
42995
4233
2237
145584
57492
49104
52744
7308
4578
44096
4322
2211
0.08
0.0155
0.008
TABLE IV. Measured coincidence counts in the diagonal basis (CXX) separately for the singlet and the
triplet states. Acquisition time is 25 seconds per combination, with the exception of the line containing the
finite-size data. There the total sample was acquired in 12,000 seconds.
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F. Error rates in the diagonal basis
Channel attenuation/distance
Singlet
|Ψ−〉
Triplet
|Ψ+〉
µi = µj
Class u v w u v w ph/pulse
2.33 dB (11.65 km)
u
v
w
31.82%
40.17%
44.07%
41.60%
38.39%
41.53%
45.37%
42.21%
43.22%
31.55%
40.67%
44.55%
40.77%
37.68%
41.28%
44.36%
41.95%
42.13%
0.01
0.002
0.001
2.33 dB (11.65 km) — Finite size
u
v
w
33.12%
40.95%
45.79%
41.20%
38.98%
41.30%
44.90%
41.64%
42.61%
32.08%
40.56%
43.93%
41.62%
38.98%
41.63%
45.33%
41.49%
43.39%
0.01
0.002
0.001
6.15 dB (30.75 km)
u
v
w
32.81%
41.56%
45.06%
40.06%
38.22%
42.17%
44.66%
41.25%
43.33%
30.83%
41.06%
45.01%
39.92%
37.46%
39.90%
43.54%
41.00%
41.27%
0.016
0.0032
0.0016
9.82 dB (49.10 km)
u
v
w
32.69%
41.41%
45.17%
41.94%
40.23%
43.75%
45.88%
42.39%
44.91%
32.42%
40.92%
44.90%
41.32%
40.07%
40.95%
44.08%
41.21%
43.12%
0.025
0.005
0.0025
50 km (9.65 dB) — Real fibre
u
v
w
32.72%
39.98%
43.21%
42.87%
39.60%
40.49%
46.10%
43.00%
42.95%
31.45%
40.96%
45.29%
41.25%
37.68%
42.24%
44.68%
42.41%
43.19%
0.025
0.005
0.0025
15.97 dB (79.85 km)
u
v
w
30.39%
39.30%
43.31%
39.77%
34.94%
38.15%
44.48%
37.56%
37.31%
31.71%
41.35%
45.25%
38.75%
34.53%
36.54%
43.13%
36.93%
39.12%
0.05
0.01
0.005
20.98 dB (104.9 km)
u
v
w
32.09%
41.70%
45.32%
40.09%
35.47%
37.94%
44.18%
37.04%
37.33%
30.83%
39.42%
43.24%
39.69%
34.21%
37.27%
44.12%
37.58%
36.27%
0.08
0.0155
0.008
TABLE V. Measured error rates (EXX) in the diagonal basis separately for the singlet and the triplet states.
Acquisition times are as in Table IV.
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G. Theoretical estimation of the visibility
The two-photon interference visibility V (στ ,∆v) obtained from two independent gain-switched
laser diodes is a function of the time jitter τ and of the bandwidth ∆ν of the interfering pulses,
which are reported on the horizontal and vertical axis of Fig. 2(a) in the main text, respectively.
Their values for the slave lasers in our setup, with and without the pulse laser seeding technique,
have been measured and are given as abscissas and ordinates, respectively, of the two empty circles
in the figure. The time jitter is assumed to follow a Normal distribution Nτ (0, στ ) centred at 0.
The visibility is plotted from the expression:
V˜ (στ ,∆v) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dτV (τ,∆v)Nτ (0, στ ) ,
where
V (τ,∆v) =
1
2
exp
[
−τ
2 + 4 (ωij + 2τβ)
2 σ4t
4σ2t
]
. (9)
The quantity V (τ,∆v) in Eq. (9) is obtained from the electric fields
ξl(t) =
√
I(t)ei(ωlt+βt
2+θl)
emitted by Alice (l = i) and Bob (l = j), which are used to estimate the coincidence counts at Char-
lie’s detectors [11, 12]. The random variable τ in Eq. (9) represents the total time jitter between the
two pulses emitted by the users measured from Charlie’s beam splitter; ωij = 2pi (νj − νi) accounts
for the (small) difference in the central frequencies νi and νj of the interfering pulses emitted by Al-
ice and Bob, respectively; σt is the standard deviation of the optical pulses having intensity profile
I(t), assumed be Gaussian, and are related to the measurable full-width-at-half-maximum of the
pulses, ∆t, by the relation σt = ∆t/
(
2
√
2 ln 2
)
. The parameter β accounts for the frequency chirp.
We assume that frequency chirp is the only cause of a bandwidth larger than the one prescribed
by the time-bandwidth product. In this case it can be shown that ∆v = ∆v(0)
√
1 + 16β2σ4t [13].
By measuring σt and the time-bandwidth product of the emitted pulses, it is possible to invert this
relation and determine the parameter β.
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